Hotel Asset and Equity Risk Before, During, and After the Global Financial Crisis by Johnson, Marilyn F. et al.
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management 
The Professional Refereed Journal of the International Association of Hospitality Financial 
Management Educators 
Volume 27 Issue 2 Article 2 
2019 
Hotel Asset and Equity Risk Before, During, and After the Global 
Financial Crisis 
Marilyn F. Johnson 
Michigan State University 
Mark S. Johnson 
Michigan State University 
Antoinette C. Tessmer 
Michigan State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm 
Recommended Citation 
Johnson, Marilyn F.; Johnson, Mark S.; and Tessmer, Antoinette C. (2019) "Hotel Asset and Equity Risk 
Before, During, and After the Global Financial Crisis," Journal of Hospitality Financial Management: Vol. 27 
: Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/8wg9-f324 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol27/iss2/2 
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Hospitality Financial Management by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
© 2019 International Association of Hospitality Financial Management Education
CONTACT: Address correspondence to  Mark S. Johnson, The School of Hospitality Business, Michigan State University, 667 N. Shaw Lane, Room 204, 
East Lansing, MI 48824, USA. Email: johnsonm@broad.msu.edu.
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2019, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 59–71
https://doi.org/10.7275/8wg9-f324
Hotel Asset and Equity Risk before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis
Marilyn F. Johnson, Mark S. Johnson, and Antoinette C. Tessmer
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we use asset betas and equity betas over the period January 2000 through December 
2015 to investigate the operating and financial risk of hotel industry REITs and C- Corps. We conclude 
that, on average over our sample period, the operating risk of C- Corps exceeds that of REITs. One 
interpretation of this result is that management contracts between REITs and C- Corps allocate more 
operating risk to C- Corps than to REITs. We also find that, on average, during our sample period, the 
equity betas of C- Corps exceed those of REITs. However, the difference between the average equity 
risk of the two sectors is much smaller than the sectors’ difference in operating risk. Because equity 
betas capture both operating and financial risk, these results imply that REITs have significantly less 
operating risk than C- Corps and offset their lower business risk with higher financial leverage. During 
the global financial crisis, operating risk increases in both hotel industry subsectors, and the amount 
by which C- Corp asset betas exceed REIT asset betas is roughly proportionate to that observed in 
noncrisis periods. During the financial crisis, however, REITs experienced a greater increase in finan-
cial leverage than did C- Corps, with the result being that the normal relation reverses, i.e., during the 
global financial crisis, REIT average equity betas significantly exceeded the average equity betas of 
C- Corps.
Key words: Hotel REITs, Hotel C- Corps, Systematic Risk, Asset Risk
1.0 Introduction
Our paper provides empirical evidence on the oper-
ating risk and financial risk of hotel- industry REITs 
and C- Corps before, during, and after the financial 
crisis. Our study is motivated by the fact that policy 
analysts disagree about the allocation of operating 
risk in the hotel industry. Eyster and deRoos (2009) 
argue that REITs bear a higher level of hotel operat-
ing risk than C- Corps because of the inherent risk 
in owning property as well as the fact that C- Corps 
have greater bargaining power than REITs in set-
ting the terms of management contracts. In con-
trast, Latter and O’Brien (2007) imply that the total 
return to REITs and C- Corps will be maximized if 
management contracts transfer operating risk from 
REITs to C- Corps, thereby allowing REITs to better 
capitalize on their comparative advantage in bearing 
financial risk.
Our study is also motivated by a desire to bet-
ter understand the impact of the global financial 
crisis of 2007– 2010 on the operating and financial 
risk of hotel REITs and hotel C- Corps. The finan-
cial crisis revealed general problems with the bifur-
cation of real estate and operations, i.e., the Opco/
Propco structure. Operating companies in industry 
segments such as healthcare and food and beverage 
experienced severe financial distress, the magnitude 
of which was not experienced by hotel C- Corps. Yet, 
the global financial crisis of 2007– 2010 undoubtedly 
resulted in an increase in hotel industry operating 
risk and financial risk, implying that an examination 
of changes in the relative amounts of operating and 
financial risk borne by REITs and C- Corps through 
time is warranted.
Prior research on risk in the hotel industry exam-
ines CAPM equity betas or equity betas derived from 
the Fama- French (1993) three- factor model (see, 
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e.g., Kim & Jang, 2012; Choudry, 2005; Philippas, 
Economou, Babalos, & Kostakis, 2013). Equity betas 
capture a stock’s co- movement with market returns 
and reflect both a firm’s operating risk, which var-
ies with fundamentals such as the firm’s operating 
leverage, sales volatility, and competitive environ-
ment, and its financial risk, which varies with inter-
est rates and the amount of debt in the firm’s capital 
structure (Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, & Jordan, 2019). 
Because equity betas capture both operating and 
financial risk, it is not possible to draw inferences 
about the allocation of operating risk from an analy-
sis that focuses solely on equity betas. Nor is it possi-
ble to draw inferences about changing financial risk 
from a measure that aggregates the two types of risk. 
To get around this problem, we analyze both equity 
and asset betas. Asset betas, which are the result of 
adjusting CAPM equity betas for financial leverage, 
are a pure measure of operating risk. By examining 
patterns in both equity and asset betas, we are able 
to draw inferences about both types of risk.
Accordingly, we conduct a longitudinal analysis 
of the equity betas and asset betas of publicly traded 
hotel Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and 
hotel C- Corps. Our sample consists of 18 REITS 
and 13 C- Corps over the period 2000– 2015. We 
analyze CAPM equity betas as well as CAPM asset 
betas, which are the betas that result when CAPM 
equity betas are adjusted for financial risk. We also 
conduct sensitivity analysis that examines whether 
our inferences about equity betas hold when the 
Fama- French (1993) three- factor model is used to 
calculate equity betas.
We find that over our entire sample period, the 
average C- Corp equity beta, 1.116, exceeds the aver-
age REIT equity beta, 1.021. In addition, the average 
asset beta of a C- Corp, 0.823, significantly exceeds 
that of a REIT, 0.468. Since asset betas measure oper-
ating risk, we conclude that the operating risk borne 
by C- Corps significantly exceeds that of REITs. In 
contrast, the difference between C- Corp and REIT 
equity betas is much smaller, consistent with REITs 
having greater financial leverage than C- Corps.
We also present evidence about changes in risk 
during the financial crisis. In contrast to the results 
for the entire sample period, the average C- Corp 
equity beta during the financial crisis, 1.540, is sig-
nificantly less than the average REIT equity beta, 
1.856. However, the normal relation between asset 
betas of C- Corps and REITs holds during the finan-
cial crisis, in that the average C- Corp asset beta, 
0.912, exceeds the average REIT asset beta, 0.549. 
Thus, C- Corps continued to bear greater operating 
risk than REITs during the financial crisis. The fact 
that the average REIT equity beta during the finan-
cial crisis exceeded the average C- Corp equity beta, 
but the average REIT asset beta during the finan-
cial crisis is less than the average C- Corp asset beta, 
implies that during the financial crisis, there was a 
proportionately larger increase in the financial risk 
of REITs than of C- Corps. As a result, the normal 
relation between equity betas of REITs and C- Corps 
is reversed. We also examine the sensitivity of our 
CAPM equity beta results to use of the Fama- French 
(1993) three- factor model. Our inferences about 
C- Corp and REIT sensitivity to market risk are 
not altered. We do not examine asset betas because 
there is no three- factor analog to CAPM asset betas.
Our study makes several contributions to the lit-
erature. Most importantly, we are the first to empiri-
cally examine asset betas of REITs and C- Corps and 
are thus able to draw inferences about the alloca-
tion of operating risk in the hotel industry. We find 
that the average asset betas of the C- Corps in our 
sample exceed those of our sample REITs and that 
the magnitude of this difference in operating risk 
between the two hotel subsectors is relatively con-
stant through time. From this evidence, we infer 
that management contracts between REITs and 
C- Corps are structured such that relatively more of 
the industry’s operating risk is borne by C- Corps. 
Evidence on the average allocation of operating risk 
is of interest to hotel managers and others involved 
in the negotiation of management contracts.
Second, our evidence shows that over our 2000– 
2015 sample period, the average equity betas of 
C- Corps exceed those of REITs. This implies that 
the higher financial risk of REITs (i.e., the average 
REIT has higher financial leverage than the average 
C- Corp) does not fully offset their lower business 
risk. Here, our conclusion contrasts with that of Kim 
and Jang (2012), whose examination of the equity 
betas of REITs and C- Corps concludes that there is 
no difference in the average equity risk of the hotel 
industry subsectors. The Kim and Jang study pre-
dates ours by six years. Thus, we have the advantage 
of a longer time period that is less influenced by the 
global financial crisis.
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Third, our examination of equity betas during the 
financial crisis enhances our understanding of the 
risk borne by REIT investors. REITs allow investors to 
diversify into real estate without illiquid investments 
in real property. REITs are often argued to protect 
investors during stock market downturns (Simon & 
Ng, 2009). Evidence that during the financial crisis, 
proportionate and absolute increases in the equity 
betas of hotel REITs exceeded those of hotel C- Corps 
suggests that in contrast to the industry overall, hotel 
REITs do not provide such protection when com-
pared with investments in hotel C- Corps.
Finally, our evidence provides insight into the 
likely impact of future financial crises on the hotel 
industry. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) state: 
“While each financial crisis is no doubt distinct, they 
also share striking similarities in the run- up of asset 
prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, 
and in current account deficits.” Financial crises 
such as we saw in 2007– 2010 have occurred in the 
past and are likely to occur again in the future. Thus, 
our paper provides investors with a likely roadmap 
for the next financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 discusses financial risk concepts used in 
our subsequent analysis. Section 3 develops our 
hypotheses. Section 4 explains our method, and 
Section 5 presents our results. We offer concluding 
remarks in Section 6.
2.0 Financial risk concepts
Finance theory views risk from the perspective of 
a well- diversified investor, so defines relevant risk 
as the firm’s exposure to market risk. This risk is 
referred to as the firm’s equity beta and is captured 
by the degree to which the firm’s returns co- vary 
with the returns on the market. Specifically, a firm’s 
equity beta is the slope coefficient from a regression 
of the firm’s return on the market return:
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit (1)
where:
Rit is the return for the ith hotel firm on day t,
αi is the intercept for the ith hotel firm,
βi is the slope coefficient for the ith hotel firm, 
i.e., firm i’s equity beta,
Rmt is the return on an equal- weighted market 
portfolio on day t, and
eit is the error term with mean zero.
A firm’s exposure to market risk, in turn, is deter-
mined by the firm’s operating risk and the firm’s 
financial risk. The higher either of these two risks, 
the higher will be the firm’s exposure to market 
risk (Ross et al., 2019, p. 405– 407). Operating risk 
reflects a wide variety of factors that include but 
are not limited to: the volatility of the firm’s sales, 
the firm’s operating leverage (i.e., the degree of 
fixed costs in the firm’s cost structure), the overall 
economic climate in the markets in which the firm 
operates, and the political and regulatory environ-
ment facing the firm and its industry. For example, 
the more a company’s sales vary with the business 
cycle (due to, e.g., the capital- intensity of the firm’s 
industry or the discretionary purchase nature of the 
firm’s products), the higher will be its operating risk.
Financial risk refers to the amount of debt in the 
firm’s capital structure and the firm’s cost of debt. 
Other things equal, the higher the firm’s financial 
leverage, the higher will be the firm’s market risk. 
Intuitively, relative to an equity financed firm, firms 
with debt financing will report higher income during 
economic expansions and lower income during 
economic downturns. In other words, required 
debt payments increase the variance in net income 
because debt payments are fixed, i.e., do not vary 
with the firm’s revenue and operating profit.
A firm’s equity beta can be adjusted for the firm’s 
financial leverage to yield an estimate of the beta the 
firm would have if it had no debt. These unlevered 
betas reflect only the firm’s operating risk and are 
referred to as asset betas. By definition, a firm’s asset 
beta is the weighted sum of its equity beta and its 
debt beta, implying the following general equation 
for calculation of an asset beta:
 β asset, i = (E/(E + D)) βequity, i + (D/(E + D)) βdebt, i (2)
where:
βasset, i is the weighted average co- movement of 
firm i’s debt and equity securities with the 
market,
βequity, i is the co- movement of firm i’s common 
equity with the market,
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βdebt, i is the co- movement of firm i’s debt with 
the market,
D is the market value of firm i’s long- term 
debt, and
E is the market value of firm i’s common 
stock.
In summary, finance professionals use the co- 
movement of a firm’s stock returns with market 
returns to measure firm risk that is relevant to well- 
diversified investors. This risk is measured by the 
firm’s equity beta. A firm’s equity beta is determined 
by the riskiness of both the firm’s operations and 
the firm’s financing. In contrast, a firm’s asset beta is 
determined solely by the firm’s operating risk.
3.0 Hypothesis development
In this section, we develop two hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis explores the relative operating risk 
of REITs and C- Corps, while the second hypothe-
sis examines how the operating risk of REITs and 
C- Corps changes during the financial crisis. Our 
hypotheses are preceeded by a literature review.
3.1 Literature review
Several prior studies examine market (i.e., equity 
beta) risk and returns in the REIT industry. The 
paper most relevant to our study is Kim and Jang 
(2012), who examine the risk- return characteristics 
and performance of hotel REITs and C- Corps. Their 
focus is on an analysis of the two groups of firms 
from the perspective of an investor constructing a 
well- diversified portfolio. Using both the CAPM 
and Fama- French (1993) three- factor model, the 
authors conclude that there is no significant dif-
ference in the equity risk- return profile of the two 
groups of firms and that the performance of both 
groups is similar to that of the overall market.
Research prior to Kim and Jang (2012) focuses on 
the REIT industry as a whole, with the goal of under-
standing whether the risk profile of a REIT invest-
ment parallels that of a private real estate investment. 
Gilberto (1990), Gyourko and Keim (1992), and 
Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) present evi-
dence consistent with the argument that the return 
on a REIT investment should be similar to the return 
on private real estate because a divergence in the 
returns on the two investments implies an arbitrage 
opportunity. In contrast, others argue that there are 
significant differences in the returns between the two 
groups because REIT values are determined not only 
by the value of the underlying real estate but also by 
tax benefits and management contracts with oper-
ating companies. Consistent with both arguments, 
empirical evidence suggests REITs should be viewed 
as hybrid securities (Anderson, Clayton, Mackin-
non, & Sharma, 2005; Ling & Naranjo, 1999). Finally, 
Kim and Jang (2012, p. 597) conclude their review of 
the literature by stating that “the relative importance 
of real estate and stock market factors in explain-
ing REIT returns seems to vary over time, while the 
direction of the change is mixed.”
Our study contributes to the prior literature 
in two respects. First, consistent with a focus on 
returns to equity investors in REITs, the prior liter-
ature examines market risk measures that reflect an 
aggregation of operating and financial risk. In con-
trast, our focus is on understanding risk from the 
perspective of a party to a management contract. 
Accordingly, we examine both equity and asset 
betas, which allows us to test hypotheses about the 
relative allocation of operating and financial risk 
between hotel REITs and hotel C- Corps. Second, 
the prior literature documents changes in risk over 
time. Our sample period includes the 2010s, a time 
period not examined by prior research.
3.2 Hypotheses about average asset and equity 
betas of REITs and C- Corps
The hotel industry includes REITs, Taxable REIT 
Subsidiaries (TRSs), C- Corps, and franchise com-
panies. REITs are pass- through entities that avoid 
federal taxation at the corporate level if at least 90% 
of earnings are paid out in dividends. Because of 
their tax- advantaged status, REITs typically own 
hotel properties that they rent to their wholly- 
owned TRSs. The creation of a TRS caps the parent 
REIT’s liability, increases its borrowing capacity, and 
reduces its cost of funds (Latter & O’Brien, 2007). 
The TRS pays a fixed fee to the REIT and signs a 
contract with a management company, which is 
typically a C- Corp or a franchise company. In 
other words, a TRS is a swap machine that converts 
uma-jhfm272.indd   62 11/20/19   5:09 PM
  THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 63
variable hotel revenues and costs into a fixed rental 
stream for the parent REIT.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the firm as 
a nexus of contracts, and Scholes et al. (2014) point 
out that business contracts will be structured to 
maximize the joint return to all parties to the con-
tract. One of the most important contracts in the 
hotel industry is the management contract between 
the REIT (through its TRS) and the C- Corp or fran-
chise company. Because management contracts 
have the potential to shift risk and return between 
the parties to the contract, the profitability of a REIT 
is not solely dependent on the quality of the assets it 
owns, and the profitability of a C- Corp is not solely 
dependent on its operating efficiency. The profitabil-
ity of both entities is also dependent on the terms of 
the management contract.
Eyster and deRoos (2009) discuss management 
contracts between owners (e.g., REITs) and man-
agement companies (e.g., C- Corps) in the hotel 
industry. Indicative of contract complexity, the two 
contract examples they provide are 44 pages and 75 
pages long, respectively. Eyster and deRoos argue 
that the majority of hotel operating risk is born by 
the property owner. However, they state: “It should 
be noted that risks are shared according to the rel-
ative bargaining strengths of the two parties and 
each party’s ability to negotiate effectively: risks can 
therefore be redistributed during contract negoti-
ations” (p. 10). Additionally, they argue that both 
parties seek risk minimization when they negotiate 
(p. 173). They further note that since the late 1990s 
and into the 2000s, “operations companies have had 
more bargaining power in contract negotiations 
than have property companies” (p. 38).
In summary, Eyster and deRoos (2009) point out 
that the inherent operating risk of REITs exceeds 
that of C- Corps and that C- Corps have bargain-
ing power relative to REITs. In contrast, Latter and 
O’Brien (2007) imply that the total return to a man-
agement contract will be maximized if some REIT 
operating risk is transferred to C- Corps, thereby 
allowing REITs to capitalize on their comparative 
advantage in accessing debt markets. Thus, policy 
analysts disagree about the relative magnitude of 
the operating risk borne by REITs and C- Corps. 
Accordingly, we offer the following two- sided pre-
diction (stated in null form):
Hypothesis 1a: Over the sample period, the 
average asset beta of REITs equals the average 
asset beta of C- Corps.
Equity risk includes both operating risk and finan-
cial risk. Kim and Jang (2012) examine the relative 
equity risk of REITs and C- Corps over the period 
2000– 2009 and conclude that there is no difference 
in the risk borne by investors in the two hotel indus-
try subsectors. However, the results of Kim and Jang 
may be confounded by the fact that the global finan-
cial crisis, when many hotel firms were near or in 
financial distress, spans approximately one- half of 
their sample period. For completeness, we also test 
the following two- sided hypothesis (stated in null 
form) examined by Kim and Jang (2012):
Hypothesis 1b: Over the sample period, the 
average equity beta of REITs equals the 
average equity beta of C- Corps.
3.3 Hypotheses about average asset and equity 
betas of REITs and C- Corps during the financial 
crisis
The global financial crisis is considered the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression (Temin, 
2010). It began with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in the United States and developed 
into an international banking crisis with the Sep-
tember 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman Brothers (Wil-
liams, 2010). Despite various regulatory reforms 
and large government bail- outs of financial institu-
tions in the United States, the crisis was nonetheless 
followed by a global economic downturn referred to 
as the Great Recession. We refer to the financial cri-
sis and the ensuing recession as the global financial 
crisis.
During the global financial crisis, the operat-
ing risk of firms in the hotel industry significantly 
increased as revenue from lodging, food service, 
and events significantly declined. As Pizam (2009) 
explains, the decline is attributable not only to fewer 
retail and conference customers but also to a signif-
icant decline in average expenditures per customer. 
Even affluent customers reduced expenditures by 
purchasing lower- priced versions of the products 
and services that they had typically purchased 
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before the crisis. The impact of this increase in oper-
ating risk is an increase in the asset betas of both 
REITs and C- Corps. The relative impact on these 
two industry subsectors will depend on the terms of 
the management contract and whether those terms 
are renegotiated in response to the crisis. Thus, the 
relative magnitude of the business risk borne by 
REITs and C- Corps during the financial crisis is also 
an open question. Accordingly, we again offer a two- 
sided prediction (stated in null form):
Hypothesis 2a: During the global financial crisis, 
the average asset beta of REITs equals the 
average asset beta of C- Corps.
Associated with an increase in business risk 
during the global financial crisis is a decline in com-
mercial property values. Figure 1 displays commer-
cial property returns over the period 2000– 2015, as 
measured by the annual percent change in Green 
Street’s Commercial Property Price Index (Green 
Street Advisors, 2018). The annual percent change 
declines in 2007 and is negative in 2008 and 2009. 
Recovery started occurring in 2010. A decline in 
asset values implies a decline in equity values. Thus, 
financial risk also increased during the Global Finan-
cial Crisis because declines in the market value of 
hotel firms’ assets imply declines in the market value 
of equity and significant increases in market- based 
debt- to- equity or debt- to-assets ratios.
Figure 2 displays the average beginning of year 
value of long- term debt relative to the market 
value of common stock for publicly traded REITs 
and C- Corps in the United States, as derived from 
COMPUSTAT data. For an ideal measure of finan-
cial leverage, both the equity value and the debt value 
should be market values. However, we use the book 
value of debt because under U.S. GAAP, most debt 
securities are valued at fair value, which approx-
imates market value. For equity, a market value is 
easily obtainable as the beginning of year price mul-
tiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Fig-
ure 2 indicates that the global financial crisis had a 
larger impact on the financial leverage of REITs than 
on the financial leverage of C- Corps. These leverage 
effects imply that in response to the financial crisis, 
there will be a larger increase in the equity betas of 
REITs than of C- Corps. Whether equity betas of 
REITs will exceed those of C- Corps also depends 
on the relative magnitude of equity risk in the two 
sub- sectors prior to the crisis. Thus, we again offer a 
two- sided prediction (stated in null form):
Hypothesis 2b: During the global financial crisis, 
the average equity beta of REITs equals the 
average equity beta of C- Corps.
4.0 Sample and study design
Our sample consists of 31 U.S.- based publicly traded 
C- Corps and REITs in SIC code 7011 for which at 
least four years of Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) stock price data is available during 
the sample period 2000– 2015. CRSP coverage 
includes firms that are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
or NASDAQ. A list of sample firms is provided in 
Table 1. Panel A of the table provides firm names 
and data availability and Panel B summarizes the 
Figure 1. Year to year percent change in Green Street’s Commercial Property Price Index.
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number of firms with available data each year. Of 
the 31 publicly traded hotel firms, 18 are REITs and 
13 are C- Corps. An examination of Table 1 Panels A 
and B reveals that several firms come into and out of 
the sample during our 16- year sample period. This 
occurs as firms enter or exit the hotel industry, go 
private, or conduct an IPO. We include firms even 
if a full 16 years of data is not available to avoid sur-
vivorship bias. In other words, we want conclusions 
about risk in the hotel industry to reflect the typical 
firm in the industry, as opposed to only successful 
firms that survived the entire period.
Table 1. Sample Description
Panel A
Firms in the sample listed by REIT versus C- Corp and dates for which data is available
TICKER Company Name Class PermNo Date In Date Out
HOST American Properties, Inc. REIT 11358 1/1/2000 12/31/2004
MGMG MGM Grand, Inc. C- Corp 11891 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
INN Summit Hotel Properties, Inc. REIT 12566 1/1/2011 12/31/2015
RLJ RLJ Lodging Trust REIT 12756 1/1/2011 12/31/2015
HST Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc. REIT 46703 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
MCS Marcus Corp. C- Corp 51423 1/1/2006 12/31/2015
MCRI Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc. C- Corp 79507 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
FCH Felcor Lodging Trust, Inc. REIT 80747 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
CDOR Condor Hospitality Trust, Inc. REIT 81087 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
HPT Hospitality Properties Trust REIT 81917 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
MHX Meristar Hospitality Corp. REIT 83718 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
MTN Vail Resorts, Inc. C- Corp 84588 1/1/2003 12/31/2015
GET Gaylord Entertainment Co. New REIT 85426 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
CHH Choice Hotels International, Inc. C- Corp 85517 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
LQI La Quinta Properties, Inc. REIT 85619 1/1/2000 12/31/2004
MAR Marriott International Inc. New C- Corp 85913 1/1/2003 12/31/2015
IHR Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc. C- Corp 86226 1/1/2000 12/31/2008
HT Hersha Hospitality Trust REIT 86563 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
AHT Ashford Hospitality Trust REIT 89803 1/1/2004 12/31/2015
SHR Strategic Hotel Capital, Inc. REIT 90217 1/1/2004 12/31/2014
SHO Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. NE REIT 90394 1/1/2004 12/31/2015
WOLF Great Wolf Resorts, Inc. C- Corp 90491 1/1/2004 12/31/2011
LVS Las Vegas Sands Corp. C- Corp 90505 1/1/2004 12/31/2015
SOHO Sotherly Hotels, Inc. REIT 90506 1/1/2004 12/31/2015
DRH Diamondback Hospitality Co. REIT 90680 1/1/2005 12/31/2015
MHGC Morgans Hotel Group Co. C- Corp 91096 1/1/2006 12/31/2015
HOT Starwood Hotels & Rest Wldwd Inc. C- Corp 91207 1/1/2000 12/31/2015
(continued)
Figure 2. Market leverage of REITs versus C- Corps from January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2015.
Note: Financial leverage = book value of long- term debt / market value of equity; book value of debt is used as a proxy for 
the market value of debt since market values are not available for most firms. Shaded area represents the financial crisis 
decline and recovery.
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4.1 Definition of the financial crisis
To test our second set of hypotheses about the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the risk of 
hotel REITs and hotel C- Corps, we need to identify 
the time period spanned by the crisis. Any defini-
tion will be somewhat arbitrary. We base our defi-
nition on a statistical analysis of the monthly Green 
Street Commercial Real Estate Price Index. A sta-
tistical analysis of the monthly commercial price 
index over the period 2000 to 2015 reveals that the 
mean percent change (standard deviation) in the 
index is 0.412% (1.724%). A 90% confidence inter-
val around the mean is +3.2% to −2.42%. Based 
upon these calculations and a visual appraisal of the 
data, we define any monthly change of 3% or more, 
in absolute value, to indicate that we are in either 
the initial decline or recovery phase of the crisis. 
This leads to a definition of the crisis as starting 
in June 2008 and the recovery continuing through 
April 2010.
4.2 Measurement of equity betas and asset betas
Equity betas change over time with changes in the 
firm’s operating and financial risk. Accordingly, we 
apply Equation 1 to estimate firm- specific equity 
betas using rolling windows. We begin on day 1 of 
our sample period, using day 1 stock returns and 
returns for the previous 254 trading days to estimate 
firm i’s equity beta on day 1. The process of beta esti-
mation is repeated for firm i on day 2, and so on. The 
result is a time series of equity betas for each firm, 
for any day on which that day and the previous 254 
days of returns are available.
To compute asset betas, we apply Equation 2, 
which tells us that a firm’s asset beta is the weighted 
sum of its equity and debt betas. In our study the 
amount of debt, D, is proxied by the book value of 
debt at the end of the year closest to, but preceding 
the first day of, the equity beta estimation period. 
E is number of common shares outstanding multi-
plied by the beginning of year price of firm i’s com-
mon stock in the year closest to, but preceding the 
first day of, the equity beta estimation period. We 
assume that the firm’s debt does not strongly co- 
move with the market. If we assume that βdebt is zero, 
then Equation 2 reduces to:
 βassets = βequity / (1 + D/E) (3)
This equation is appropriate for REITs in our sample 
because REITs pay no federal taxes. Hence, we use 
Equation 3 to unlever REIT equity betas.
Table 1. Sample Description (continued)
Panel A
Firms in the sample listed by REIT versus C- Corp and dates for which data is available
TICKER Company Name Class PermNo Date In Date Out
H Hyatt Hotels Corp. C- Corp 93098 1/1/2009 12/31/2015
PEB Pebblebrook Hotel Trust REIT 93178 1/1/2010 12/31/2015
CLDT Chatham Lodging Trust REIT 93314 1/1/2010 12/31/2015
Note: All REITs are Propcos. The C- Corp, Interstate Hotels and Resorts, is a pure Opco. Choice Hotels International is a franchise company, 
a type of C- Corp in which the corporation franchises the property and provides some management services. Since Choice Hotels provides 
some of the management services and expertise but does not own properties it is a specialized type of Opco. The remaining C- Corps listed 
above manage hotels and to a greater or lesser degree own some hotel properties.
Panel B
Number of firms in the sample listed by REITs, C- Corps, and total by year
Year REITs C- Corps Total
2000– 2002 9 5 14
2003 9 7 16
2004 13 9 22
2005 12 9 21
2006– 2008 11 11 22
2009 11 12 23
2010 13 12 25
2011 15 12 27
2012– 2014 15 11 26
2015 14 11 25
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We take a slightly different approach for C- Corps 
because C- Corps are taxed by the federal govern-
ment. If we introduce the idea that debt interest 
payments are a tax- deductible expense and tc is the 
firm’s marginal corporate tax rate, then:
 βassets = βequity / (1 + (1 −  tc)D/E) (4)
We assume that all C- Corps face the same corpo-
rate tax rate of 34%. Using this assumption, we then 
apply Equation 4 to unlever the equity betas of our 
sample C- Corps.
To form portfolios, we begin by dividing the sam-
ple into two groups consisting of hotel REITs and 
hotel C- Corps. We compute equal- weighted REIT 
portfolio equity (asset) betas for each day by aver-
aging the individual firm equity (asset) betas avail-
able on that day. Similar computations are made on 
each day for all of the C- Corps. These average equity 
and asset betas are then used to test for differences 
between the two groups over the entire time period 
and during the global financial crisis.
5.0 Results
This section provides the results of the analysis. 
Section 5.1 compares the asset betas of REITs with 
those of C- Corps over the entire sample (Hypothesis 
1a) and during the financial crisis (Hypothesis 2a). 
Section 5.2 compares the equity betas of REITs with 
those of C- Corps over the entire sample (Hypothesis 
1b) and during the financial crisis (Hypothesis 2b). 
Section 5.3 presents sensitivity analysis using the 
Fama- French (1993) three- factor model. Through-
out Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we use parametric t- tests 
and non- parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests 
to analyze our hypotheses. We discuss the t- stats in 
the body of the paper. Inferences from the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank tests are reported in the tables and are 
qualitatively similar.
5.1 Asset beta of REITs and C- Corps
Figure 3 plots average daily asset betas for REITs 
and C- Corps over the period 2000– 2015. A visual 
examination of the figure shows that the average 
REIT asset beta is less than the average C- Corp 
asset beta over the entire time period and during 
the financial crisis. This result is confirmed by the 
t- tests of hypotheses Hypothesis 1a and Hypothe-
sis 2a provided in Table 2. Specifically, both in cri-
sis and out of crisis the differences are statistically 
and economically significant. Over the entire time 
period, the average C- Corp asset beta is 75.8% 
larger ((0.823−0.468)/0.468) than the average REIT. 
Although asset betas for both subsectors increase 
during the financial crisis, the relative magnitudes 
of the two sectors’ operating risk remain similar. 
During the financial crisis, the average asset beta 
for C- Corps was 66.1% larger ((0.912−0.549)/0.549) 
than the average REIT asset beta. The similarity in 
this relationship in- crisis versus otherwise is strik-
ing. If the inherent operating risk of a REIT exceeds 
that of a C- Corp (Eyster and deRoos, 2009), then 
Figure 3. Asset betas for REITs versus C- Corps (2000– 2015).
Note: Annual adjustment based on market value of equity and book value of long- term debt as of December 31 of previous 
year.
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this result implies that management contracts shift 
operating risk from the REIT to the C- Corp and 
that this shift occurs in all states of the economy.
5.2 Equity betas of REITs and C- Corps
Figure 4 plots average daily equity betas for REITs 
and C- Corps over the period 2000– 2015. A visual 
examination of Figure 4 suggests that C- Corp 
equity betas exceed the equity betas of REITs, with 
the exception of the global financial crisis, when 
REIT equity betas exceeded C- Corp equity betas. 
This analysis is confirmed by the statistical tests 
in Table 3. A t- test of the null hypothesis that the 
average equity beta of the two groups is the same 
(Hypothesis 1b) is rejected. Over the sample period, 
the average equity beta for C- Corps is 8.5% larger 
((1.116−1.021)/1.021) than the average equity beta 
for REITs. Thus, an equity investment in REITs is 
less risky than is an equity investment in C- Corps. 
In contrast, using a shorter time period that is more 
heavily influenced by the financial crisis, Kim and 
Jang (2012) conclude that there is no difference in 
the market risk of the two subsectors. This differ-
ence in the two groups’ equity betas is much smaller 
than is the average difference in the two groups’ asset 
betas. One interpretation of the combined results is 
that management contracts shift business risk from 
REITs to C- Corps. REITs then offset their lower 
business risk with higher financial leverage.
This higher financial leverage negatively impacted 
REITs during the global financial crisis, due to a 
proportionately larger decline in equity in response 
to falling asset prices. As we see in Figure 2, REITs 
experienced a proportionately larger increase in 
financial leverage than C- Corps. A t- test of the 
mean differences in equity betas during the finan-
cial crisis (Hypothesis 2b) rejects the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference in the equity risk of the 
two subsectors. Average REIT equity betas during 
the crisis are 20.5% larger ((1.856−1.540)/1.540) 
than average C- Corp equity betas. Thus, the crisis 
Table 2. Asset Betas for REITs vs C- Corps (2000– 2015)
t- test: Two- Sample Assuming Unequal Variances      
  1/1/2000
REITs
12/31/2015
C- Corps
6/1/2008
REITs
10/31/2010
C- Corps
Mean 0.468 0.823 0.549 0.912
Variance 0.038 0.064 0.022 0.017
Observations 4,025 4,025 610 610
t-stat 70.325 *** 45.378  ***
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 97.641 +++ 42.782  +++
*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two- tailed t- test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
Note: The conclusion that REIT asset beta is much lower than C- Corp asset beta is robust to different assumptions regarding C- Corp tax rates. 
The above results assume that REITs face a 0% tax rate and C- Corps face a 34% corporate tax rate. If we assume that both REITs and C- Corps 
face the same, 0%, tax rate results in average C- Corp asset beta of 0.6541, which is still 40% higher than the average asset beta for REITS.
Figure 4. Equity betas for REITs versus C- Corps (2000– 2015).
Note: CAPM- based beta calculation, on a daily basis with a 255- day estimation window.
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resulted in an anomalous period during which an 
equity investment in a REIT was riskier than an 
equity investment in a C- Corp.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our 
equity beta results to use of the Fama- French (1993) 
three- factor model rather than the CAPM. The 
three- factor model was developed in response to the 
fact that small and value companies had persistently 
higher returns than could be explained by the 
CAPM. There is no asset beta analog for the three- 
factor model, so we do not present formal hypoth-
esis tests.
Results from the three- factor estimation are 
presented in Table 4. As do Kim and Jang (2012), 
we find that for both C- Corps and REITs, each of 
the three factors explains returns. Consistent with 
the results reported in Table 3, the coefficient on 
the market factor estimated for C- Corps (REITs) 
is higher (lower) than the coefficient for REITs 
(C- Corps) for the complete period (financial crisis 
period). In addition, the coefficients on the firm size 
Table 3. CAPM equity betas for REITs versus C- Corps
1/1/2000
REITs
12/31/2015
C- Corps
6/1/2008
REITs
10/31/2010
C- Corps
Mean 1.021 1.116 1.856 1.54
Variance 0.258 0.13 0.12 1.54
Observations 4,025 4,025 610 610
t- test 9.696 *** −19.322 ***
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 28.925 +++ −42.782 +++
*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two- tailed t- test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
Table 4. Fama- French Three- Factor Results
Panel A. FF- 3 Beta one results (the market beta)
1/1/2000
REITs
12/31/2015
C- Corps
6/1/2008
REITs
10/31/2010
C- Corps
Mean 0.931 1.048 −1.477 1.264
Variance 0.133 0.051 0.164 0.024
Observations 4,025 610 610
t-stat 17.257 *** −12.1462 ***
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 102.213 +++ −28.662 +++
Panel B. FF- 3 Beta two results (small/big portfolios)
1/1/2000
REITs
12/31/2015
C- Corps
6/1/2008
REITs
10/31/2010
C- Corps
Mean 0.604 0.581 1.163 1.042
Variance 0.115 0.104 0.073 0.054
Observations 4,025 610 610
t-stat −3.105 *** −8.385 ***
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test −8.209 +++ −15.016 +++
Panel C. FF- 3 Beta three results (high book/low book portfolios)
1/1/2000
REITs
12/31/2015
C- Corps
6/1/2008
REITs
10/31/2010
C- Corps
Mean 0.472 0.319 0.958 0.699
Variance 0.156 0.13 0.119 0.022
Observations 4,025 4,025 610 610
Hypothesized mean difference 0 0 0
Df 7984 830
t-stat −18.058 *** −16.991 ***
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test −109.893 +++ −37.001 +++
*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two- tailed t- test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
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and book- market factors are larger for REITs than 
for C- Corps. Inferences about overall model fit are 
similar to those in Kim and Jang (2012).
6.0 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we use asset betas and equity betas 
over the period January 2000 through December 
2015 to investigate the asset beta and equity beta risk 
of hotel industry REITs and C- Corps. We conclude 
that, over our sample period, the average asset beta 
of hotel C- Corps exceeds that of hotel REITs imply-
ing that C- Corps bear greater operating risk. We 
also find that, on average over our sample period, 
the equity betas of C- Corps exceed those of REITs, 
implying that the combined operating and financial 
risk of C- Corps exceeds that of REITs. However, the 
difference between the average equity beta risk of 
the two sectors is much smaller than is the differ-
ence in the operating risk between the two hotel sec-
tors, consistent with REITs having higher financial 
leverage due to their tax- advantaged position.
We also find that during the global financial cri-
sis, operating risk increases by modest amounts in 
both hotel industry subsectors, and the amount by 
which C- Corp asset betas exceed REIT asset betas is 
roughly proportionate to that observed in non- crisis 
periods. During the financial crisis, however, REITs 
experienced a greater increase in financial leverage 
than did C- Corps, with the result being that the nor-
mal relation reverses. I.e., during the global financial 
crisis, the combined operating and financial risk of 
REITs, as measured by their equity betas, signifi-
cantly exceeded the average equity betas of C- Corps.
These results suggest a nuanced view of risk allo-
cation in the hotel industry. On the one hand, for the 
firms in our sample, management contracts between 
hotel REITs and hotel C- Corps allocate greater 
operating risk to C- Corps than to REITs. This is 
consistent with arguments by analysts such as Lat-
ter and O- Brien (2007), who conclude that the total 
return of all parties to a hotel management contract 
is maximized if the management contract allocates 
greater operating risk to C- Corps than to REITs, 
thereby allowing REITs to make optimal use of their 
tax- advantaged status through high financial lever-
age. On the other hand, our results are also consis-
tent with analysis of Eyster and deRoos (2009), who 
argue that C- Corps have greater bargaining power 
than REITs. Their greater bargaining power may 
explain why hotel C- Corps fared better during the 
financial crisis than operating companies in other 
segments of the REIT industry, e.g., food and bever-
age Opcos and healthcare Opcos.
Of course, an alternative explanation for hotel 
C- Corps relative strength during the financial cri-
sis is that the source of hotel C- Corps bargain-
ing power— their brands— allowed them to better 
whether the financial crisis. We leave exploration of 
the explanation for hotel C- Corps’ relative strength 
during the financial crisis to future research.
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